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Abstract
This paper offers a re-assessment of the finance-growth nexus in a framework that
allows to distinguish between short-run versus long-run effects. Our dataset contains
information on 45 developed and developing countries over the period 1995-2011. We
make use of the integration and cointegration properties of the data, establish a cointe-
grating relation and derive the long-run elasticities of per capita GDP with respect to
employment, the physical capital stock, and financial development. We employ these
results to specify an error correction model and assess whether the years of crisis have
changed the relationship between finance and growth.
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1 Introduction
The financial crisis changed substantially the perception of how financial markets impact
on the real economy. While the work of King and Levine (1993a) motivated an avenue
of research, which by and large shared the view that banks and financial markets provide
important services to the economy and thereby foster growth (Levine, 2005), this percep-
tion has to be reconsidered in face of recent developments. Even though a few studies find
a weak or even negative relationship between financial development and growth, the bulk
of the evidence supports the finding of a positive finance growth nexus. With the spillover
of the financial turmoil to the real economy in the second half of 2008, the public, political
and academic discussion on this subject matter changed substantially. Obviously, though
finance provides important services for the economy, the growth of the financial sector con-
tributed to the most severe financial crisis since the great depression, and this was most
certainly not beneficial for long-run economic growth. As Beck (2013) points out, “the
financial sector can be both a growth engine and a source of economy-wide fragility and
crisis” (p. 49). The nexus between finance and growth hence needs a renewed assessment
that takes into account what we learned from the crisis.
One question crucial for this reassessment is the distinction between short- and long-
run effects. The objectives of this paper are therefore to assess whether the years of crisis
have changed the relationship between finance and growth and to do so in a setting that
distinguishes short-run from long-run effects. Making use of the integration and cointegra-
tion properties of data on per capita GDP, employment, the capital stock, and financial
depth for a sample of 45 developed and developing countries over the time period 1995-
2011, we employ panel cointegration techniques, which at the same time address a number
of critical issues that have been brought up in the empirical finance-growth literature such
as omitted variables and endogeneity. We examine the long-run relationship which is
supposed to represent equilibrium conditions in the economy and allow for nonlinearities
using a threshold model. In the next step, we set up an error correction model to address
the differential impact of finance on growth in the short- and in the long-run. Finally, we
assess whether the parameters of the model have changed in response to the crisis.
The questions we raise are highly topical and of great political importance for various
reasons. First of all, it is important to have an in-depth understanding of the link of
financial intermediation and economic growth. As short run and long run effects might
work in the opposite direction, it is important to disentangle them in the empirical analysis.
Second, in order to have an understanding of the implications of financial stress, one has
to be aware of the interplay of short-run effects with longer term equilibrium-enforcing
relationships and the speed of adjustment across different countries, regions, and time
periods. Based on this assessment, well designed policy measures can strengthen those
links, that promote long-run growth, while at the same time implementing appropriate
regulatory policies to avoid short run instabilities.
This paper differs from other papers as we employ an empirical strategy that dis-
tinguishes between short-run and long-run effects while at the same time accounting for
possible nonlinearities in the the finance-growth nexus and potential parameter instability.
We find, that while there seems to be a positive long-run relationship of finance and per
capita GDP when assuming a homogeneous relationship, this positive relationship can not
hold for countries with a high level of financial depth, where credit to the private sector
exceeds a level of 68.5% of GDP. For these countries with a high level of financial depth,
there is a significantly negative relationship of finance and economic output. Furthermore,
we find that there is no impact of finance on growth in the short-run. Finally, the applica-
2
tion of an end-of -sample instability test shows that there is evidence for a structural break
at the end of the sample, indicating that the financial crisis has changed the parameters
of the finance growth nexus.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a short overview over impor-
tant contributions on the finance-growth nexus. In section 3 we present the data and the
empirical strategy. In section 4 we identify the long-run relationship of finance and per
capita GDP based on both linear and nonlinear models. In section 5 we set up a panel
error correction model, using the estimates of the long-run relationship to construct homo-
geneous and regime-specific error correction terms. In section 6 we examine whether the
parameters in the error correction model have changed at the and of the sample relying
on Andrews (2003) end-of-sample instability test. Section 7 offers robustness checks with
respect to different measures of financial depth and section 8 concludes.
2 Literature
The question to which extent financial markets contribute to economic growth, was ad-
dressed in numerous studies from the theoretical as well as the empirical side. One of
the first contributions originates in Schumpeter (1911) who put forward the idea that the
banking system has a key role in enabling innovative entrepreneurs to finance and market
their products. The supposedly positive role of finance for growth was however challenged
ever since.
Roughly clustered, economic theory offers two main explanations concerning how fi-
nance can affect growth. Through the quantitative channel increased financial deepening
leads to a mobilization of savings and hence, faster accumulation of capital. Through the
qualitative channel, financial intermediation facilitates the financing of innovation projects
and thereby increases total factor productivity (Ang, 2008).
Levine (2005) discusses the literature along five main channels by which finance has an
impact on growth. First, financial systems allocate capital more efficiently than private
savers by their advantage in gathering relevant information on possible investments. As
the acquisition and use of information is difficult and comes at a high cost, financial
intermediaries facilitate the process of judging potential investment projects and thereby
allow capital to be used most efficiently. Second, financial markets improve the monitoring
of investments and the exertion of corporate governance - be it in a bank based system or
via financial markets. Third, financial markets have an important role in the trading and
diversification of risk and risk management, since financial markets make possible to pool,
trade, resell, and diversify the risk associated with certain projects and allow intertemporal
risk sharing. The fourth channel captures the above mentioned mobilization of savings
and finally, the role of financial services in easing exchange by lowering transaction costs
and lower transaction costs might foster growth.
There is an extensive empirical literature studying the relationship of finance and
growth. In their seminal paper, King and Levine (1993a) show that financial indicators are
significantly and positively correlated with growth. Furthermore the financial indicators at
the beginning of the period are a good predictor of the average rate of real per capita GDP
growth, which indicates that the results are not driven by finance simply following growth.
In King and Levine (1993b), the authors develop a growth model in which productivity
growth is determined endogenously and extend the King and Levine (1993a) results by
instrumenting for financial development.They confirm the King and Levine (1993a) finding
that finance predicts growth.
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Levine and Zervos (1998) construct a series of stock market indicators and assess the
relationship with economic growth, capital accumulation, and productivity growth. They
show that while the initial level of stock market liquidity and the initial level of banking
development (bank credit) have a positive impact on economic growth over the following
18 years, the pure size of the stock market, volatility, and integration in world capital
markets do not determine economic growth.
Beck et al. (1999) re-examine the King and Levine (1993a) results by improving upon
the methodology using an instrumental variable approach as well as dynamic panel tech-
niques. Beck et al. (2000) assess the finance growth nexus with a focus on the sources
of growth. Their results confirm the finding that financial deepening affects total factor
productivity growth, but the link of financial development with capital accumulation or
the private savings rate is not robust to altering estimation methods or different financial
deepening indicators.
Benhabib and Spiegel (2000) estimate a Solow (1956) model with human capital and
an endogenous growth model based on Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), extending the speci-
fications with the King and Levine (1993a) measures of financial deepening. Their results
indicate that financial development is an important factor determining GDP growth and
that an increase in total factor productivity is the main channel by which a higher level
of financial development translates to higher growth. Based on industry-level data, Rajan
and Zingales (1998) show that industries which depend to a higher degree on external
finance do better in countries with a higher level of financial depth.
A number of time series studies address the issue of causality (see for example Neusser
and Kugler, 1998; Choe and Moosa, 1999; Luintel and Khan, 1999; Bell and Rousseau,
2001; Rousseau and Vuthipadadorn, 2005; Arestis and Demetriades, 1997). Well in line
with cross country studies, these analyses mostly conclude that causality runs from finan-
cial development to growth. Arestis and Demetriades (1997) however point out that the
findings vary considerably from country to country. Christopoulos and Tsionas (2004) ad-
dress the issue of causality in a panel cointegration framework. They show that long-run
causality runs from financial development to growth and find no support for a short-run
effect of finance on growth. Similarly, Wu et al. (2010) apply a cointegrated panel to
assess the impact of financial institutions on growth in the European Union. They find
that there is a long run relationship between credit markets, stock markets and economic
development.
Several recent studies investigate whether there is a threshold, above which the effect
of financial development might turn insignificant or even negative. Arcand et al. (2012)
find that finance has a negative impact on economic growth when private credit exceeds
a threshold of 100% of GDP. There are a number of explanations why there might be a
negative relationship of finance and growth at high levels of financial depth. One likely
explanation is that a high degree of financial depth increases the probability of banking
crisis. Arcand et al. (2012) however show that this is only one factor which can not
fully explain a negative nexus at high levels of financial depth. Other factors contain the
importance of a well functioning regulatory framework and hence country heterogeneity,
an adverse allocation of resources, and the quality and type of credit (see Beck, 2013, for
a discussion on the opposed effect of firm credit and household credit).
Using a semiparametric approach, Herwartz and Walle (2014) confirm the finding that
the effect of finance on growth depends on the set of countries and show that the impact
of financial development on growth varies with income, where there is a stronger impact
in richer economies. This finding is confirmed by Henderson et al. (2013) who base their
analysis on kernel methods that allow for heterogeneity in partial effects and conclude
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that while rich countries benefit from more finance, there is no beneficial effect of financial
development on growth for poor countries.
The large number of studies devoted to reassess the finance-growth nexus in recent
years shows that the crisis has changed the perception of a supposedly positive relation-
ship of finance and growth and that research is needed that examines the subject matter
on a differentiated level, that disentangles short-run from long-run effects and addresses
potential non-linearities and structural breaks.
3 Data
We employ domestic credit to the private sector as % of GDP as a measure of financial
development as this allows us to compare our results to previous studies and delivers
a comparatively long time series dimension. It is however not straightforward to find
an appropriate overall measure for financial depth (Ang, 2008). We therefore conduct a
series of robustness checks using the following measures of financial depth suggested by
the literature: credit provided by banking sector as (% of GDP) and liquid liabilities (M3)
(as % of GDP) to capture the role of financial institutions and listed domestic companies,
market capitalization (as % of GDP), financial market depth (as % of GDP), and stock
market turnover ratio (% of GDP) to investigate the role of financial markets for per capita
GDP growth (see section 7) .
We apply a similar econometric framework as in Christopoulos and Tsionas (2004),
but base the empirical model on a production function with total income of country i
in period t, (Yit), being a function of the physical capital stock (Kt), labor input (Nit),
and a measure of financial development (FDit), which is a determinant of total factor
productivity.
Yit = K
α
itN
β˜
itFD
γ
it (1)
For total income Yit, we use GDP at constant 2005 USD, for labor Nit total em-
ployment, and we employ data on the physical capital stock provided by Berlemann and
Wesselhoeft (2012). All variables expect the physical capital stock stem from the World
Development Indicators (WDI) Database. As we wish to evaluate the impact of financial
depth on GDP per capita, we transform the relationship in (1) by dividing by Nit and tak-
ing the natural logarithm. Hence, the basic empirical model for the long-run relationship
reads
ln yit = α lnKit + β lnNit + γ lnFDit + it, (2)
where we use per capita GDP, yit, as measure of output per effective labor, such that
α is the elasticity of per capita GDP with respect to the capital stock, γ is the elasticity
of per capita GDP with respect to the financial depth indicator (here private credit over
GDP) and the elasticity of per capita GDP with respect to total employment, β is given
by (β˜ − 1).
We employ a broad sample of 45 developed and developing countries (see list of coun-
tries in the Appendix) over the period 1995-2011, which yields a high degree of variation
in the data. The GDP per capita series covers countries with very low levels of economic
development such as Sri Lanka, which reports an average per capita GDP of 967.4 USD as
well as rich countries such as Switzerland which has an average per capita GDP of 51938.8
USD. The same is true for private credit, where our sample contains countries with very
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Figure 1: Correlation of GDP per capita and private credit
high average values of private credit to GDP such as 319.5% of GDP in Iceland and coun-
tries with very low average levels of private credit such as 8.8% of GDP in Venezuela. The
median of the sample is 80.6 % of GDP and the mean 85.9% of GDP.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
GDP per capita Capital Stock Employment Private Credit
Mean 20299.100 2.14E+12 17176008.000 85.887
Median 18461.600 4.36E+11 5553718.000 80.555
Maximum 58009.800 3.10E+13 149000000.000 319.461
Minimum 1028.540 2.04E+10 153851.900 7.824
Std. Dev. 16273.920 5.15E+12 26230615.000 58.739
Observations 542 542 542 542
Figure 1 shows the scatter plot of GDP per capita and private credit for the time
period 1995-2011 and 2007-2011. We see that, as suggested by the recent literature on the
topic, the relationship seems to have weakened in recent years. The positive correlation
among the two main indicators used in this study, does however remain. Table 1 shows
the descriptive statistics on per capita GDP, the capital stock, employment and private
credit.
Unit Root and Cointegration Tests
We suppose that equation (2) represents a long-run economic relationship between per
capita income, total employment, the capital stock of the economy and the level of financial
depth. Even though there may be deviations from this relationship in the short run, they
should not have a permanent impact but lead to an adjustment process that maintains the
economy close to this relationship in the longer term. Such a relationship that extracts the
stationary and equilibrium enforcing component of by themselves nonstationary processes
is generally known as cointegrating relation.
In order to evaluate the integration and cointegration properties of the variables, we
conduct a series of panel unit root and cointegration tests. We employ the Levin et al.
(2002) (LLC), Breitung (2005) and Im et al. (2003) (IPS) panel unit root tests to test for
unit roots in the data. All three tests are performed on the basis of Augmented Dickey
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Fuller regressions, where LLC and Breitung (2005) test against the null hypothesis of a
common unit root while the IPS test runs the regression for each cross-section and uses the
mean of the individual specific t-statistics to test against the null hypothesis of individual
unit root processes. The results of the tests indicate that per capita GDP, employment,
and private credit are all integrated of order one, even though the LLC test rejects the
null hypothesis of a common unit root in all series due to the considerable heterogeneity
in the data. For the physical capital stock, the LLC tests rejects the null hypothesis of a
common unit root in levels and first differences, while the IPS test cannot reject the null
hypothesis of individual unit root processes in levels but rejects for the first differences.
To examine whether the variables given in equation (2) are cointegrated, we rely on
the Pedroni (1999, 2004) residual based cointegration test. Pedroni (1999) suggests seven
tests statistics to test for panel cointegration: the panel v-statistic, panel rho-statistic,
panel PP-statistic, panel ADF-statistic, group rho-statistic, group PP-statistic, and group
ADF-statistic. The tests are conducted in two steps, where the first step is to run the
regression ln yit = α lnKit+β lnNit+ γ lnFDit+ it for each cross section and the second
step is to test whether the it are stationary. The results support the hypothesis of a long-
run equilibrium cointegrating relationship among per capita GDP, the physical capital
stock, employment, and private credit. (Table 12 and Table 13 in the Appendix report
the results for the unit root and cointegration tests).
The implementation of our empirical strategy involves proceeding in two separate steps,
where in the first step (section 4), we estimate the cointegrating relation (based on a linear
and on a nonlinear model) and in the second step, we set up the error correction model,
where we use the estimates of the first step to construct the error correction term (section
5).
4 Identifying the long-run relationship
We employ the dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) estimator put forward by Saikko-
nen (1995) for estimating the cointegrating relation in a panel as it delivers unbiased and
asymptotically efficient estimates of the coefficients in (12) when confronted with possible
endogeneity among the variables. Therefore, the basic equation is augmented by lags and
leads of the included variables, such that we estimate with OLS the following equation:
ln yit = a+ α lnKit + β lnNit + γ lnFDit
+
k∑
j=−k
φ1,ij∆ lnKit−j +
k∑
j=−k
φ2,ij∆ lnNit−j +
k∑
j=−k
φ3,ij∆ lnFDit−j + uit (3)
As was shown by Wagner and Hlouskova (2010), this estimator outperforms the other
estimators such as the fully modified OLS estimator in panels where the time series di-
mension is relatively short. In the first model, we include only country fixed effects and in
the second model we include country and period fixed effects in the estimation and we set
k = 1 because of the short time series dimension. We estimate equation (3) with the White
method for coefficient variances that yields robust standard errors under cross-sectionally
correlated errors.
The estimated long-run elasticities are presented in Table 2. In model 1, where we
include only country fixed effects, the elasticities of per capita GDP with respect to em-
ployment and the capital stock are 37% and 30%, both highly significant. The elasticity
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Table 2: Long-run relationship of per capita GDP with employment, capital stock and
private credit
ln N ln K ln FD Obs
1) DOLS estimator 0.3660*** 0.3041*** 0.1611*** 490
Country FE (0.0685) (0.0386) (0.0111)
2) DOLS estimator 0.0191 0.1170*** 0.0856*** 490
Country and Period FE (0.0719) (0.0405) (0.0127)
Dependent variable is ln y
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis,
***(**)[*] indicates significance at the 1% (5%)
of financial depth is also positive and estimated to be 16%, which is also highly significant.
When we include also period fixed effects, the effect of employment on per capita GDP is
estimated to be close to zero, while the elasticities of the capital stock and financial depth
are now estimated to be half as strong but still significantly positive at 12% and 9%. From
this first look at the long-run relationship, where we assume a homogeneous relationship
for all countries, one would conclude that there is a positive and significant effect of fi-
nancial depth on GDP, when measured with private credit. This simple regression hence
seems to confirm previous results of a positive finance growth nexus.
4.1 Nonlinear Model with Exogenously Determined Regimes
As demonstrated in recent empirical work, the nexus of financial depth and growth might
come from a nonlinear relationship, where the effect of finance on growth depends on
the achieved level of financial depth or income (see for instance Arcand et al., 2012).
In this section, we suggest a set of models that incorporate nonlinearities in the long-
run relationship between financial depth and growth. In so doing, we allow for different
long-run parameters for financial depth in the cointegration vector for different regimes
depending on the average financial depth of each country. We first distinguish between
low, medium, and high levels of financial depth where the three regimes are given by
countries with an average credit to GDP ratio below the 33th quantile (regime 1), above
the 33th quantile but below the 66th quantile (regime 2) and above the 66th quantile
(regime 3). In the next step, we do not chose the thresholds arbitrarily but we estimate a
threshold model, where the indicator function clusters the countries in three regimes. The
thresholds are chosen by estimating all possible models that ensure a minimum of 10%
of observations in each regime and choosing the model with the lowest sum of squared
residuals (SSR).
Table 3 depicts the estimated long-run coefficients if we estimate the model separately
for countries with low, middle or high levels of financial depth. The results are remarkable
as they confirm the hypothesis of the recent literature, which suggests that at high levels of
financial depth, the impact on growth is likely to diminish or even become negative. While
in countries with a low level of financial depth, finance has a positive and strong effect on
GDP, which is significant at the 1% significance level, this effect diminishes as the level of
credit to GDP increases and eventually becomes significantly negative for countries with
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Table 3: Long-run relationship of per capita GDP with employment, capital stock and
private credit
ln N ln K ln FD ln FD ln FD ln FD R2 Obs
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3 Regime 4
With Country Fixed Effects
0.1651 0.3233*** 0.2546*** 0.986 155
(0.1095) (0.0768) (0.0221)
0.4812*** 0.3295*** 0.0897*** 0.986 154
(0.1296) (0.0732) (0.0290)
0.991 181
0.0721 0.6682*** -0.0304*
(0.1065) (0.0720) (0.0156)
With Country and Period Fixed Effects
-0.5764*** 0.0847 0.1043*** 0.992 155
(0.1318) (0.0776) (0.0210)
-0.0436 0.4340*** -0.0078 0.999 154
(0.1586) (0.0671) (0.0311)
0.1041 0.4976*** -0.0356** 0.992 181
( 0.1048) (0.0972) (0.0147)
With Country Fixed Effects
0.3237** 0.2929*** 0.2486*** 0.987 116
(0.1400) (0.1111) (0.0227)
0.2419 0.5752*** 0.0578*** 0.999 128
(0.1664) (0.0987) (0.0196)
0.3350** 0.3982*** -0.0047 0.998 130
(0.1378) (0.0830) (0.0149)
0.0640 0.7428*** -0.0907** 0.993 116
(0.1514) (0.0937) (0.0377)
With Country and Period Fixed Effects
-0.4752** 0.0458 0.0990*** 0.991 116
(0.1894) (0.1263) (0.0297)
-0.0483 0.3991*** 0.0154 1.000 128
(0.1082) (0.0832) (0.0176)
0.1581 0.4120*** -0.0486** 0.999 130
(0.1717) (0.0935) (0.0219)
0.0632 0.6707*** -0.0687 0.994 116
(0.1514) (0.1245) (0.0477)
Dependent variable is ln y.Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis
***(**)[*] indicates significance at the 1% (5%)
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a very high level of credit to GDP. The lower part of Table 3 shows the results for the
model with country and period fixed effects.
If we divide the sample into four subsamples, the estimation yields very similar results
with an insignificant or negative impact of finance on GDP as financial depth becomes
higher. For the model with country and period fixed effects, the impact of finance on
growth becomes negligible in the second regime and is negative in the third and fourth
regime. The lower panel in Table 3 summarizes the results of applying four regimes.
4.2 Threshold Model
The regime-specific estimations indicate that country heterogeneity has indeed a substan-
tial role in how finance impacts on GDP and their results make obvious that it is important
to distinguish between different levels of financial depth. We therefore estimate the fol-
lowing threshold model, where the thresholds are chosen by rolling estimation windows
with a minimum of 10% of observations in each regime and according to the model with
the lowest sum of squared residuals (SSR). More specifically, we estimate the model
ln yit = a+ α lnKit + β lnNit
+ γτ1 lnFDit ∗ Iτ1 + γτ2 lnFDit ∗ Iτ2 + γτ3 lnFDit ∗ Iτ3
+
k∑
j=−k
φ1,ij∆ lnKit−j +
k∑
j=−k
φ2,ij∆ lnNit−j +
k∑
j=−k
φ3,ij∆ lnFDit−j + uit, (4)
where Iτ1 defines the regime covering all countries with an average credit to GDP level
below the τ th1 -quantile and τ1 = 10, . . . , 89. The second regime is defined accordingly with
the average credit to GDP being above the τ th1 -quantile and below the τ
th
2 -quantile which
runs from τ2 = τ1 + 10, . . . , 99. The third regime covers all countries with the average
credit to GDP above the τ th2 -quantile. We estimate the model with country fixed effects
and with country and period fixed effects and choose the best model according to the SSR
- and thereby the thresholds which determine the regimes. For the model with country
fixed effects, we end up with a model, where the first regime is defined by a threshold
covering all observations below the 12th quantile, the second regime by the following 37%
of observations and the third regime applying to countries with an average financial depth
indicator above the 49th quantile.
The results of the threshold model underpin the general direction of the previous model
with exogenously chosen regimes. Credit to GDP becomes less beneficial for per capita
GDP at higher levels of financial depth and the effect of private credit on GDP eventually
becomes negative. This is also the case for the threshold model which is displayed in Table
4. While the impact of credit on GDP is large in the lowest regime - a 1% higher credit
to GDP share is associated with 30% increase in per capita GDP, this effect is not even
half as strong in the second regime and insignificant in third. When country and period
fixed effects are included, the effect is strong in the first regime, decreases to one third of
the initial effect for higher levels of credit and becomes negative in the third regime.
As a robustness check, we also include education (average years of total schooling above
the age of 25 from the Barro-Lee dataset given in the Education Statistics of the World
Bank) in our model. The inclusion of education (EDUC) does not alter our estimates for
the coefficients of financial development in the cointegrating regression and only slightly
changes the size of the effect of the capital stock or employment when comparing the
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Table 4: Threshold model
ln N ln K ln FD ln FD ln FD R2 Obs
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3
With Country Fixed Effects
0.1732** 0.4857*** 0.2982*** 0.1150*** 0.0000 0.999 490
(0.0848) (0.0522) (0.0207) (0.0175) (0.0156)
With Country and Period Fixed Effects
-0.0844 0.3133*** 0.2189*** 0.0700*** -0.0698*** 0.999 490
(0.0788) (0.0609) (0.0192) (0.0145) (0.0147)
Dependent variable is ln y
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis,
***(**)[*] indicates significance at the 1% (5%)
estimation results for the same sample (the sample contains fewer countries when education
is included). The coefficient of education itself does not show up to be significant, so we
conclude that education does not play a major role in our model and we can use our main
specification as given in equation (3).
Table 5: Threshold model with education
ln N ln K ln EDUC ln FD ln FD ln FD R2 Obs
Regime 1 Regime 1 Regime 1
With Country and Period Fixed Effects
-0.0846 0.1697** 0.0561 0.1970*** 0.0967*** -0.0688*** 0.999 396
(0.0912) (0.0689) (0.0870) (0.0364) (0.0168) (0.0161)
Dependent variable is log GDP per capita.Heteroskedasticity robust Standard errors in parenthesis
***(**)[*] indicates significance at the 1% (5%)
5 Error-Correction Model
To examine the short-run and long-run effect of finance on growth, we make use of the
integration and cointegration properties of the data and specify an error-correction model.
We construct the error correction term using the long-run elasticities of per capita GDP
with respect to employment, the physical capital stock, and financial development which
we have gained in the previous section. The basic error correction model reads
∆ ln yit = b0 + b1∆ ln yit−1 + b2∆ lnNit−1 + b3∆ lnKit−1 + b4∆ lnFDit−1
+φECt−1 + it (5)
where the error correction term ECt reflects the deviations from equilibrium such that
ECt = ln yit − [αˆ lnKit + βˆ lnNit + γˆ lnFDit]. A significant (negative) error-correction
coefficient, φ, implies long-run causality, which is equilibrium enforcing in the sense that
a deviation from the long-run equilibrium triggers an automatic adjustment back to equi-
librium and φ measures the speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium. If we can
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reject the null hypothesis that φ = 0, then this is a strong indication of a long-run causal
effect of finance (private credit) on growth.
In order to use the estimates from equation (2) for the construction of the error correc-
tion term, we have to ensure that the error correction term (which reflects the deviations
from equilibrium) is stationary. Testing the error correction term in the linear model for
unit roots yields however mixed results. For the whole sample period, both the LLC test
and the IPS test cannot reject the null hypothesis of a common unit root when no trend
is included in the Dickey Fuller equation. If a trend is included, the LLC test rejects,
while the IPS test does not. We can however reject the unit root hypothesis in both tests
when we cut off the sample at the start of the global crisis and run the test for the sample
1995-2009 and include a trend. For the error correction term including country and period
fixed effects, only the LLC test rejects. Looking at the error correction term based on the
nonlinear model, the LLC test rejects in the model with trend as well as in the model
without a trend, when the years of crisis are excluded. Also, for the error correction term
based on the model with country and period fixed effects, both tests now reject, if we
exclude the crisis. The unit root tests on the error correction terms therefore support the
use of a nonlinear model rather than a linear model. Further, the results indicate that
the years of crisis might have had an impact on the long-run equilibrium relationship. We
address this issue in section 6.
The results of the basic error correction model are presented in Table 6. We find that,
while the DOLS estimation showed the positive long-run relationship of per capita GDP
and financial depth, this positive relationship does not hold for the short run. First, there
is no statistically significant short-run effect of financial depth on GDP. This is to be ex-
pected, as the channels through which finance enhances productivity growth and a more
efficient allocation of capital will take time and cannot materialize within short time peri-
ods. Second, an increase in the capital stock leads to a decrease in per capita output in the
short-term. This result reflects the short-run nature of the estimated parameters - where
an increase in the capital stock reflects higher savings and hence a cut in consumption.
One central result of our the error correction model is however the highly significant
coefficient of the error correction term. We estimate a speed of adjustment parameter of
φce = 0.054 and φcpe = 0.047, depending on whether period fixed effects are included or
not. The speed of adjustment parameter implies that a deviation from equilibrium today
triggers a 5% adjustment of the original deviation each period.
Together with the results of the long-run specification, the results of the error correction
model demonstrate the importance of disentangling short-run from long-run effects in the
analysis of the finance-growth nexus. Financial depth does have a long-term but no short-
term impact on the economy. The results show that the benefits of financial services in
enabling and facilitating economic activity do not arise from a financial sector being a
growth sector in itself (see Beck, 2013). The positive impact realizes in the long-run,
and whenever there is a deviation from equilibrium, e.g. whenever per capita GDP is too
high given a certain level of capital stock, employment and financial depth, there is an
automatic adjustment to a predetermined long-term equilibrium level.
In an attempt to allow for short-run heterogeneity in the speed of adjustment param-
eter, we include an interaction dummy for various groupings of countries interacted with
the error correction term in the model
∆ ln yit = b0 + b1∆ ln yit−1 + b2∆ lnNit−1 + b3∆ lnKit−1 + b4∆ lnFDit−1
+φECt−1 + IG ∗ φGECt−1 + it, (6)
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where IG and φG denote the interaction dummy and speed of adjustment parameter of
group i. We tested for possible group specific speed of adjustment parameters in the CEE
region, emerging markets, rich and poor economies and countries with low and high levels
of financial depth. For none of these groupings we find a statistically significant group-
specific error-correction estimate. Furthermore, we include dummies for different average
levels of financial depth to allow for group-specific short-run coefficients of financial depth.
This model reads
∆ ln yit = b0 + b1∆ ln yit−1 + b2∆ lnNit−1 + b3∆ lnKit−1
+IGL ∗ bL∆ lnFDit−1 + IGM ∗ bM∆ lnFDit−1 + IGH ∗ bH∆ lnFDit−1+
φECt−1 + it, (7)
where the interaction dummies are chosen to capture low, medium, and high levels of
financial depth. We do not find strong evidence for group-specific short-run coefficients of
financial depth, even though in the model with country and period fixed effects, the short-
run coefficient is positive and significant at the 1% level indicating that for high financial
depth countries, there might be a negative long-run but a positive short-run impact of
financial depth on GDP growth.
5.1 Error-Correction Model with Regime-Specific Long-Run Coefficients
Table 7 presents the results for the error-correction model when we use the regime-specific
long-run estimates for the construction of the error-correction term. This implies that we
compute the deviations to the regime-specific equilibrium and incorporate the resulting
disequilibrium vector in the error-correction specification. As is to be expected, the use
of regime-specific equilibrium yields higher estimated speed of adjustment parameter. As
a result, also significance increases and the error correction term is now highly significant
at the 1% level in all specifications.
Besides this, the short-run effects do not change very much when we use regime-specific
estimates, regardless of whether we use country fixed effects only or country and period
fixed effects. GDP per capita appears to be strongly persistent. If period fixed effects
are included, the coefficient of employment on per capita GDP appears to be positive
and significant suggesting that there is a positive impact of employment in the short run.
There is a negative short-run impact of the capital stock in all models but the model with
country and period fixed effects in the cointegrating and error-correction specification.
Finally, we do not find a short-run effect of financial depth on growth. Overall, the results
confirm the hypothesis of a differing impact of the capital stock, employment, and financial
development on per capita GDP in the short- and in the long-run. They also underline
the importance of accounting for cointegration in the analysis of financial depth on per
capita GDP.
6 End-of-Sample Instability
In this section, we wish to account for the the possibility of a change in the parameters
through the years of the global financial and economic crisis. The past years have left
no doubt on the importance of financial stability and the risks associated with financial
deepening. Obviously, even though finance provides important services for the economy,
the growth of the financial sector contributed to a global financial crisis with tremendous
negative effects on long-run economic growth. As is to be expected regarding the long-run
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Table 6: Error-Correction Model
Effects in Cointegrating Regression
Country FE Country FE
∆ ln y (-1) 0.1946*** 0.2724*** 0.1952*** 0.2729***
(0.0728) (0.0730) (0.0728) (0.0728)
∆ ln N(-1) 0.0678 0.1577 0.0639 0.1549
(0.0850) (0.0755) (0.0853) (0.0766)
∆ ln K (-1) -0.6071*** -0.3860*** -0.6170*** -0.3951***
(0.1467) (0.1261) (0.1470) (0.1267)
∆ ln FD(-1) 0.0055 0.0026 0.0041 0.0016
(0.0080) (0.0063) (0.0086) (0.0068)
EC Term -0.0549* -0.0467* -0.0584* -0.0489*
(0.0319) (0.0247) (0.0337) (0.0257)
EC Term CEE 0.0471 0.0320
(0.0776) (0.0622)
Effects in EC Model
Country FE Y Y Y Y
Period FE N Y N Y
Dependent variable is ∆ ln y
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis,
***(**)[*] indicates significance at the 1% (5%)
Table 7: Error-Correction Model with Regime Specific Long-run elasticities
Effects in Cointegrating Regression
C FE in Coint C FE in Coint CP FE in Coint CP FE in Coint
∆ ln y (-1) 0.2327*** 0.2897*** 0.2161*** 0.3073***
(0.0741) (0.0749) (0.0707) (0.0717)
∆ ln N(-1) 0.0986 0.1520* 0.0974 0.1666**
(0.0833) (0.0749) (0.0839) (0.0742)
∆ ln K (-1) -0.3952*** -0.3074** -0.3752*** -0.1981
(0.1523) (0.1359) (0.1416) (0.1454)
∆ ln FD(-1) 0.0106 0.0057 0.0100 0.0065
(0.0082) (0.0064) (0.0081) (0.0066)
EC Term -0.0825*** -0.0817*** -0.0756*** -0.1103***
(0.0317) (0.0297) (0.0206) (0.0318)
Country Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Period Fixed Effects N Y N Y
Dependent variable is ∆ ln y.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis,
***(**)[*] indicates significance at the 1% (5%)
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Table 8: Error-Correction Model for Full Sample and Pre-Crisis Sample
Linear Model Nonlinear Model
1998-2011 1998-2007 1998-2011 1998-2007
∆ ln y (-1) 0.2724*** 0.2280** 0.3073*** 0.2899***
(0.0730) (0.1015) (0.0717) (0.0891)
∆ ln N(-1) 0.1577** 0.0232 0.1666** 0.0427
(0.0755) (0.0923) (0.0742) (0.0918)
∆ ln K (-1) -0.3860*** -0.7010*** -0.1981 -0.3658**
(0.1261) (0.1637) (0.1454) (0.1662)
∆ ln FD(-1) 0.0026 -0.0017 0.0065 0.0031
(0.0063) (0.0068) (0.0066) (0.0069)
EC Term -0.0467* -0.0457 -0.1103*** -0.1744***
( 0.0247) (0.0301) (0.0318) (0.0406)
All models contain country and period fixed effects in cointegrating regression and error
correction model, Dependent variable is ∆ ln y.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis,
***(**)[*] indicates significance at the 1% (5%)
elasticities for the whole sample period in comparison to the sample which excludes the
years 2008-2010, the positive impact of finance on growth is estimated to be stronger,
when we exclude the years of the crisis (11% instead of 8% for the model with country and
period fixed effects). . Looking at the error-correction model for the whole sample and
the pre-crisis sample (see Table 8), we find for both samples that while the adjustment to
equilibrium plays an essential role when including regime-specific equilibria, we do not find
significant error correction when assuming a homogeneous long-run relationship. Besides
this, we find that the speed of adjustment is much faster in the years 1998-2007 than for the
whole sample, which is a sign of a change in the way the economy reacts to deviations from
equilibrium and which might also indicate the formation of a new equilibrium relationship
between per capita GDP and financial depth.
In order to make a qualified assessment of a possible change in the short-run parame-
ters, we would like to employ a statistical test on parameter instability. Andrews (2003)
proposes a test for parameter instability at the end of the sample. For the error correction
model in (8) with the number of regressors d = 5, n observations before the changepoint
and m observations after the changepoint
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∆ ln yit =

b0 + b1∆ ln yit−1 + b2∆ lnNit−1
+b3∆ lnKit−1 + b4∆ lnFDit−1+
φECt−1 + it
for i = 1, . . . , n,
b1i0 + b
1i
1 ∆ ln yit−1 + b1i2 ∆ lnNit−1
+b1i3 ∆ lnKit−1 + b1i4 ∆ lnFDit− 1
+φ1iECt−1 + it
for i = n+ 1, . . . , n+m
(8)
the null hypothesis of no structural break is given byH0 : bj = b
1i
j and φ = φ
1i for all j =
1, . . . , 4 and i = n + 1, . . . , n +m while the alternative is H1 : bj = b1ij for at least one j
or φ = φ1i, for some i = n + 1, . . . , n + m. The S test statistic is similar to the F test
but uses a transformation of the model by the square root of the inverse of the covariance
matrix of the errors. This allows less restrictive assumptions on the residuals. For the
case where m ≤ d, S is equal to the transformed residual sum of squares. Andrews (2003)
suggests a parametric subsampling method to gain critical values, where the observations
before the changepoint are used to obtain the distribution of the S statistic by computing
S based on the full sample estimators for all n −m + 1 windows of length m before the
changepoint. The relatively short time dimension of the sample in this paper, does how-
ever not allow to compute critical values with asymptotic validity for hypothesis testing.
We nevertheless report the best possible implementation of the test, which uses the full
sample coefficient estimates of the error correction model to gain a set of test statistics,
given by the residual sum of squares, for overlapping three year windows starting in 1998
to the period of instability 2008-2010. We then calculate the 95th quantile of the pre-crisis
statistics as critical values for a comparison to the S test statistic for the period 2008-2010
where we apply as well the full sample coefficient estimates. We obtain p-value below
0.05 for the error correction model based on the linear and the nonlinear cointegrating
regression, indicating that we do face parameter instability at the end of the sample and
that the years of the global financial crisis have changed the relationship of financial depth
and economic growth.
7 Robustness Checks
As laid out in section 2, different parts of a well functioning financial system provide
different services to the economy. It is difficult to find an ideal measure of all these
services altogether. We use credit to the private sector as a main variable as it allows
us to do the analysis for a broad set of countries and the results can be compared easily
to other studies. The literature on the finance growth nexus suggests a couple of further
indicators that each captures a different role of finance having an impact on economic
growth.
We first include domestic credit provided by the banking sector as % of GDP in the
analysis, which is a similar but a broader indicator than credit to the private sector.
In the adjusted sample, that ensures a balanced panel structure, both indicators have
equally many observations. The panel unit root and cointegration tests suggest that
domestic credit by the banking sector is I(1) and cointegrated with per capita GDP,
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employment, and the capital stock. Table 10 shows the estimated long-run elasticities of
different financial depth indicators. Using the broader measure of domestic credit provided
by banking sector does not change the coefficients substantially, even though the results
for model 2 with country and period fixed effects are not significant for employment and
the capital stock and financial depth is significant only at the 10% significance level.
Looking at the error correction model (see Table 11), we find that the central results keep
unchanged. There is a negative short-run impact of the capital stock, no short-run impact
of financial depth and high persistence in GDP. The error correction term points in the
same direction, but for the broader measure, the correction is no more significant in model
2. Overall, the long-run and short-run impact of finance on growth decreased when we use
the broader measure instead of credit to the private sector, which to some degree supports
the finding of Beck (2013), that for growth it matters “who gets the credit”.
King and Levine (1993a) suggest to use liquid liabilities (M3) as % of GDP as a proxy
for financial depth. Even though this is a measure that captures the pure size of the
financial system and none of the various services provided by either financial institutions
or financial markets, we estimate the long-run elasticities as well as the error correction
model with liquid liabilities as the financial depth measure. The data on liquid liabilities
covers 38 countries from 1996 to 2011, which yields 579 observations that include countries
with very low values (such as Slovenia in 2011 with 5.4%) to countries with very high values
(such as Hong Kong with 313.63%). The unit root and cointegration tests allow us to use
liquid liabilities as an alternative financial depth indicator. Compared to our baseline
estimation with private credit, we obtain a lower elasticity of per capita GDP with respect
to employment but a higher elasticity with respect to the capital stock, while the long-run
effect of financial depth stays the same - no matter if it is measured with private credit or
liquid liabilities. For the error correction model, we see that using liquid liabilities does no
lead to an automatic adjustment mechanism to their long run equilibrium in both models.
Table 9 lists a set of other potential measures of financial depth, which do however not
fulfill the unit root precondition and can therefore not be used as an alternative indicator
for financial depth in our analysis.
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Table 9: Descriptive Statistics for Different Financial Depth Indicators
Indicator Mean Median Max Min SD Obs Source IPS
Private Credit 1) 83.59 71.89 319.46 8.33 58.63 608 WDI I(1)
Bank credit 2) 98.50 83.27 337.47 10.51 67.49 608 WDI I(1)
Liquid liabilities 3) 71.81 56.77 313.69 4.26 52.32 579 GFDD I(1)
DMB assets 4) 83.15 68.42 275.39 4.17 57.42 575 GFDD I(1)
Financial Depth 5) 125.51 104.77 620.51 7.85 96.39 430 GFDD I(0)
SM turnover 6) 66.65 53.20 393.30 0.12 56.31 571 GFDD I(0)
DMBA/ DMCBA 7) 93.94 97.53 100.00 46.20 8.56 549 GFDD I(0)
Listed Dom. Companies 8) 635.19 239.00 8851.00 7.00 1181.3 608 WDI I(0)
SM capitalization 9) 72.47 46.73 606.00 0.02 79.12 606 GFDD I(0)
NPL 10) 4.86 2.90 42.00 0.10 5.64 436 WDI I(0)
Value traded 11) 58.90 27.51 726.54 0.00 84.08 569 GFDD I(0)
1) Private Credit is Domestic credit to the private sector (% of GDP)
2) Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of GDP)
3) Liquid liabilities to GDP (%)
4) Deposit money bank assets to GDP (%)
5) Sum of Market capitalitzation and Outstanding domestic private debt securities to GDP (%)
6) Stock market turnover ratio (value traded/capitalization) (%)
7) Deposit money bank assets to deposit money bank assets and central bank assets (%)
8) Listed Domestic Companies, total
9) Stock market capitalization to GDP (%)
10) Bank nonperforming loans to total gross loans (%)
11) Stock market total value traded to GDP (%)
8 Conclusions
In this paper, we make use of the integration and cointegration properties of per capita
GDP with employment, the capital stock and financial depth and set up a model that
allows to distinguish between short-run and long-run effects of financial depth on growth.
Specifically, we estimate a panel error correction model in a two-step procedure, where
the first steps involves the estimation of the cointegrating vector, yielding the long-run
elasticities of per capita GDP with employment, the capital stock and the financial depth
indicator. We find that in the long-run there appears to be a positive impact of finance
on growth as long as we assume a homogeneous long-run equilibrium for all countries
in the sample. Allowing for a heterogeneous long-run relationship and estimating the
cointegrated regression with thresholds in financial depth, reveals that the assumption
of a homogeneous long-run relationship can not hold. In all models which allow for a
group-specific effect of finance on GDP, we find that while low levels of financial depth are
beneficial for GDP, at higher levels of financial depth, finance loses its positive impact on
GDP and the effect eventually becomes significantly negative for countries with a financial
depth level above a threshold of private credit to GDP of 68.5%.
We use the estimates of the long-run elasticities to obtain the error correction term for
both the homogeneous and regime-specific cointegrating vector, where for the latter case
the error-correction term captures deviations to the regime specific long-run equilibrium.
The results demonstrate the relevance of long-run stationary equilibria between per capita
GDP, employment, the capital stock and financial depth. Further, they confirm the appli-
cation of a model that allows to distinguish between long-run and short-run effects. While
there is as strong long-run relationship between financial depth and GDP, in the short run,
changes in financial depth do not have substantial impact on economic growth. Finally,
we find that the years at the end of the sample - the years of financial and economic crisis
- do alter the parameters of the model.
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Table 10: Long-run relationship of per capita GDP with employment, capital stock and
different financial depth indicators
ln N ln K ln FD R2 Obs
LFD = Private Credit
1) DOLS estimator 0.3660*** 0.3041*** 0.1611*** 0.998 490
Country FE (0.0685) (0.0386) (0.0111)
2) DOLS estimator 0.0191 0.1170*** 0.0856*** 0.998 490
Country and period FE (0.0719) (0.0405) (0.0127)
LFD = Bank Credit
1) DOLS estimator 0.3618*** 0.3475*** 0.1288*** 0.997 503
Country FE (0.1119) (0.0762) (0.0338)
2) DOLS estimator -0.0885 0.1129 0.0427* 0.998 503
Country and period FE (0.0849) (0.0763) (0.0239)
LFD = Liquid Liabilities
1) DOLS estimator 0.2106* 0.4419*** 0.1553*** 0.998 410
Country FE (0.1131) (0.0833) (0.0434)
2) DOLS estimator 0.0164 0.1814* 0.0848*** 0.998 410
Country and period FE (0.0886) (0.0936) (0.0324)
LFD = DMB Assets
1) DOLS estimator 0.2029 0.5798*** 0.0154 0.998 402
Country FE (0.1334) (0.0768) (0.0172)
2) DOLS estimator -0.0331 0.1897* 0.0000 0.998 402
Country and period FE (0.0937) (0.1036) (0.0143)
Dependent variable is ln y.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis,
***(**)[*] indicates significance at the 1% (5%)
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Table 11: Error-Correction Model for different financial depth indicators
Effects in Cointegrating Regression
Country FE Country FE Country FE
Bank Credit Liquid Liabilities DMB Assets
∆ ln y (-1 0.2824*** 0.2025*** 0.1739** 0.2518*** 0.1505** 0.2365***
(0.0741) (0.0753) (0.0825) (0.0682) (0.0831) (0.0698)
∆ ln N(-1) 0.1633** 0.0713 0.1131 0.2158*** 0.1111 0.2041**
(0.0754) (0.0845) (0.0909) (0.0798) (0.0930) (0.0816)
∆ ln K (-1) -0.3204** -0.5572*** -0.6180*** -0.3993** -0.6027*** -0.3815**
(0.1311) (0.1498) (0.2114) (0.1761) (0.2184) (0.1855)
∆ ln FD(-1) 0.0010 0.0058 0.0025 0.0130 0.0028 0.0183
(0.0088) (0.0108) (0.0141) (0.0120) (0.0162) (0.0120)
EC Term -0.0502** -0.0528 -0.0532 -0.0410 -0.0437 -0.0395
(0.0252) (0.0329) (0.0435) (0.0293) (0.0462) (0.0332)
Country Fixed Effects Y Y N Y N Y
Period Fixed Effects N Y Y Y Y Y
Dependent variable is ∆ ln y.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis,
***(**)[*] indicates significance at the 1% (5%)
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Appendix
9 Countries Included in the Dataset
Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, China,
Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Singapore,,
Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United
Kingdom, United States, Venezuela
10 Tables
Table 12: Panel unit root tests
Levels First Differences
Statistic p-value. Statistic p-value
GDP
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -3.9141*** 0.0000 -9.4416*** 0.0000
Breitung t-stat 3.2404 0.9994 -3.1502*** 0.0008
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat 0.9234 0.8221 -4.7744*** 0.0000
Employment
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -3.6278*** 0.0001 -9.4528*** 0.0000
Breitung t-stat 2.5980 0.9953 -3.7687*** 0.0001
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat 0.8013 0.7885 -4.3185*** 0.0000
Capital Stock
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -4.51368*** 0.0000 -7.83753*** 0.0000
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat 1.00403 0.8423 -3.20018*** 0.0007
Private Credit
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -4.7863*** 0.0000 -11.7689*** 0.0000
Breitung t-stat 4.2570 1.0000 -1.6862** 0.0459
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat 0.3394 0.6328 -6.0924*** 0.0000
The Augmented Dickey Fuller regressions of the above tests include a constant and
a trend for GDP, employment and private credit. We include 1 lag to account for
autocorrelation. The regressions of the test for the capital stock include a constant
and country specific number of lags.
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Table 13: Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test
Weighted
Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob.
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs. (within-dimension)
Panel v-Statistic 0.5683 0.2849 -0.9622 0.8320
Panel rho-Statistic 2.6156 0.9955 2.7986 0.9974
Panel PP-Statistic -2.6313 0.0043 -2.5904 0.0048
Panel ADF-Statistic -4.9730 0.0000 -5.3367 0.0000
Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs. (between-dimension)
Statistic Prob.
Group rho-Statistic 5.2920 1.0000
Group PP-Statistic -5.8811 0.0000
Group ADF-Statistic -11.2658 0.0000
Trend assumption: No deterministic trend
Included observations: 532
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC with a max lag of 3
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